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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SELLING THE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY BENEATH A
RELIGIOUS MONUMENT THAT VIOLATES THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY OR
INFRINGEMENT?

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1802, Thomas Jefferson assured religious adherents that the religion
clauses of the First Amendment were designed to erect “a wall of separation
between Church and State.”1 Despite the tranquility that these words brought
to the Danbury Baptists,2 the history of the United States is replete with
“official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of religion’s
role in American life.”3 From the words of the Founding Fathers transcribing
their belief in God4 to the presence of religious monuments in public parks,5
our history is full of instances evincing religion’s strong role in government.
In fact, religion has been so intertwined with our history and government that it
is almost inseparable.6
Undoubtedly, our country is a religious nation,7 and although the total
separation envisioned by Jefferson’s proverbial wall may not be feasible or
required,8 the religion clauses were designed “to prevent, as far as possible, the
[unnecessary] intrusion of either the church or the state into the precincts of the
other.”9 Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the religion clauses and of the tests

1. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
2. See id.
3. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (citing Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)).
4. Id. at 683 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212–13
(1963)).
5. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2005); cf. Books v.
Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 858–60 (7th Cir. 2005) (also describing religious works on public
property, in this case depictions of the Ten Commandments inside County Administration
Buildings); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing religious
monument on City Municipal Building lawn).
6. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 687 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212; Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 434 (1962)).
7. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
8. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
9. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at
614).
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articulated by the Supreme Court has been a convenient weapon for all sides of
the current religious war being fought in America’s public parks.10
Under the guise of secular memorials, religious organizations of every
creed are seeking to promote their principles and beliefs by donating and
constructing religious monuments on government property.11 Although nonadherents and other religious organizations typically challenge the
constitutionality of these religious monuments,12 their attempts to preserve
their religious equality are often thwarted by creative governmental action and,
in part, by the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate a fixed rule to evaluate
these monuments.13 However, through the confusion it remains evident that a
government may not demonstrate a preference for one religion over another.14
Even when a constitutional challenge is successful, and a court determines
that a monument violates the Establishment Clause, local governments, state
governments, and Congress suspiciously seek alternative measures to prevent
the removal of these unconstitutional religious monuments.15 Specifically,
governments sell the monument and the property directly beneath it to a
private party asserting that such action ameliorates the Establishment Clause
violation, because the post-sale display of the monument represents the private
religious speech of the new property owner.16 Typically, governments offer
these “sales” exclusively to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness to
preserve the monument.17 Even when the property is publicly offered for sale
and additional bids are accepted, governments sometimes refuse to follow local

10. PETER IRONS, GOD ON TRIAL: LANDMARK CASES FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS
BATTLEFIELDS 2 (2007).
11. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
“there was a national effort to distribute as many as 5,000 monuments of the Ten Commandments
throughout the country”).
12. See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) (plurality
opinion).
13. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–88 (2005) (plurality opinion).
14. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994)
(citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
15. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 768–72 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying en banc
review) (Congress passed statutes to hinder the removal of a Latin Cross), petition for cert. filed
sub nom, Kempthorne v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2008) (No. 08-472), cert.
granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3458, 3467 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472);
see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th
Cir. 2000) (city sold the religious statue after suit was filed).
16. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
17. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 781 (Congress did not open the bidding for the property to the
general public); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2005) (property
was solely offered to the original donor of the monument); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492
(City did not solicit alternative bids for the property).
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law and, despite higher bids, engineer their way out of selling the property to a
bidder who has not demonstrated a willingness to preserve the monument.18
This note will analyze whether the sale of a constitutionally infringing
monument and the government property beneath it is sufficient to cure the
Establishment Clause violation and whether it is permissible under the
Constitution. Section II briefly surveys the Supreme Court’s turbulent
Establishment Clause jurisprudence pertaining to religious monuments in
public parks. Section III analyzes possible remedial options for curing an
unconstitutional display of a religious monument in a public park. Section IV
provides this author’s analysis of whether the overwhelming presumption that
a sale of government property beneath an unconstitutional monument is
sufficient to protect religious equality and whether the presumption, as applied,
conforms to the principles of the Constitution. Section V concludes with this
author’s proposal for a standard that is not prone to manipulation and that
would provide more protection for the sacred right of religious equality.
II. SUPREME COURT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . .”19 Though this language is explicitly directed at
Congress, the First Amendment has been incorporated and made applicable to
the States and localities through the Fourteenth Amendment.20
The Establishment Clause has generated much controversy, because
governmental action “respecting the establishment of religion” is not easily
Specifically, although governmental action might not
identifiable.21
“establish” a religion, an action may “respect an establishment” by merely
being a step that could eventually lead to an establishment of religion.22
Furthermore, being that the Establishment Clause resembles an objective more
than an applicable statute, the Supreme Court has been unsuccessful in its
attempts to articulate a rule that works for all instances to decipher whether
governmental conduct violates the Establishment Clause.23 In fact, the
opaqueness of the Establishment Clause has led various Supreme Court
Justices to propose different approaches to determine when the outer limits of

18. See Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005) (the City
awarded the property to the original donor although its bid was smaller than those of its
competitors).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985).
21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
22. Id.
23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
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the Clause are breached.24 Regardless of the test employed, defining whether
governmental conduct violates the Establishment Clause requires an extremely
fact-intensive inquiry.25
A.

The Lemon Test

In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court adopted a tripartite analysis to
scrutinize governmental conduct under the Establishment Clause and to protect
against “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity.”26 The “Lemon test” provides that government
conduct must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) have a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster “an excessive
entanglement with religion.”27 If governmental action violates any of these
principles, it violates the Establishment Clause.28
In Stone v. Graham, the first case dealing with the display of religious
symbols on government property, the Supreme Court employed the Lemon test
to analyze a Kentucky statute that required the Ten Commandments to be
posted on the walls of public school classrooms.29 The court held that because
the mandatory posting of the Ten Commandments had a preeminent religious
purpose, it violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test.30 The court also
noted that an “avowed” secular purpose would be insufficient to avoid conflict
with the Establishment Clause.31

24. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION VOLUME 2:
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 157 (2008) (noting five approaches by Supreme Court members
as “(1) the threefold test of Lemon v. Kurtzman…(2) endorsement, (3) consistency with historical
practice or understanding, (4) coercion, and (5) decision of specific issues in light of the values of
nonestablishment but without any guiding standard”). See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (noting the
Supreme Court’s repeated unwillingness to be confined to a single test or criterion for evaluating
Establishment Clause cases).
25. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
27. Id. at 612–13; Id. at 625 (holding that state statutes consisting of salary supplements paid
to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools and reimbursement of nonpublic schools for
teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials used in the teaching of specific secular
subjects promoted secular purpose, but involved the excessive entanglement of the State with
religion).
28. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980).
29. Id. at 39–41.
30. Id. at 41–43 (noting that instilling values and illustrating the connection between the Ten
Commandments and the current legal system were possible secular motives).
31. Id. at 41.
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The Endorsement Test

Four years later, the Supreme Court again applied the Lemon test to
evaluate the display of a religious symbol on public property.32 In Lynch v.
Donnelly, the court analyzed whether the inclusion of a crèche in the City of
Pawtucket’s Christmas display, which also included a Santa Clause house, a
Christmas tree, and a Seasons Greetings banner, violated the Establishment
Clause.33 In upholding the constitutionality of the display, the court concluded
that the purposes of the city’s display, to celebrate the Christmas holiday and
to depict its origins, were purely secular.34 Additionally, the court held that
although the display of the crèche may incidentally benefit Christianity, the
benefit conferred was merely an indirect result of recognizing the origins of the
Christmas holiday and was insufficient to have an effect of advancing or
endorsing religion.35
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor articulated and proposed a new
“endorsement” test that sought to clarify the effect and purpose prongs of the
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test condemns any
Lemon test.36
governmental favoritism of religion, because it “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.”37 Justice O’Connor also
indicated that when analyzed under the endorsement test, Lemon’s purpose
prong inquires “whether the government intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”38 Similarly, the endorsement
approach construes Lemon’s effect prong as an inquiry into whether “a
government practice. . . [has] the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion[,]” regardless of whether
the effect was intentional.39
The endorsement test also indicated that the determination of whether the
government has acted in a manner that creates the impression of endorsement

32. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679–80 (1984).
33. Id. at 671, 687.
34. Id. at 681.
35. Id. at 683. The Court also determined that the display of the crèche did not excessively
entangle the government and Christianity, because there was no evidence of “comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance” of the display or any contact between the
church and the government pertaining to the display at all. Id. at 684 (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
36. Id. at 691–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor concluded that the City of
Pawtucket’s display of the crèche is not an endorsement of the Christian faith, but is instead a
display celebrating a public holiday. Id. at 692.
37. Lynch, 485 U.S. at 688.
38. Id. at 691.
39. Id. at 692.
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depends on the message as interpreted by a “reasonable observer.”40 Justice
O’Connor noted that this reasonable observer is more informed than a mere
“casual passerby”41 and “must be deemed aware of the history of the conduct
in question and must understand [the symbol’s] place in our Nation’s cultural
landscape.”42
In its first application of the endorsement test in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a
crèche erected on the grand staircase of the County Courthouse and a menorah
erected in front of the City-County Building during the holiday season violated
the Establishment Clause.43 Noting that the crèche was the focal point of the
County Courthouse’s holiday display and that there was nothing detracting
from its religious message, the court held that the crèche was displayed in a
manner that sent an “unmistakable message” that the county supports and
promotes the Christian message.44 However, the court held that the display of
the menorah, which was next to the county’s 45-foot Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty, did not violate the Establishment Clause, because it was
unlikely that it conveyed a message that the government was endorsing the
beliefs associated with the menorah and denouncing all other religions.45
C. Ostensible and Predominate Purpose
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Supreme Court analyzed
the constitutionality of two Kentucky Counties’ decisions to construct large
displays of the Ten Commandments in their respective courthouses.46 Shortly
after the suits challenging the displays commenced, the Counties expanded the
Ten Commandments displays to include American historical documents but
emphasized and focused on the documents’ religious passages and references
to God.47 Subsequently, the district court awarded a preliminary injunction
requiring the removal of the displays, but the Counties again amended the
displays to include several more secular documents of historical and legal
significance to the United States.48

40. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778–779 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 779.
42. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
43. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579–81, 587
(1989).
44. Id. at 598–600.
45. Id. at 620.
46. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005) (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 852–54, 869–70.
48. Id. at 854–56.
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In analyzing the Counties’ actions, a plurality of the Supreme Court noted
that “[w]hen the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose
of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of
[maintaining] official religious neutrality. . . .”49 Additionally, “an
understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact,
without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”50 The court
elaborated that the eyes that inquire into the government’s “purpose belong to
an ‘objective observer,’ who takes account of the traditional external signs that
show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,’ or
comparable official act.”51
The McCreary Court also noted that when determining whether
governmental action has a secular purpose, the legislature’s stated reasons will
generally receive deference if the purpose is “genuine, not a sham, and not
merely secondary to a religious objective.”52 However, government action is
unconstitutional when the “openly available data support[s] a commonsense
conclusion that a religious objective permeate[s] [from] the government’s
action.”53 Additionally, when the claim is an apparent sham or the secular
purpose is secondary, courts have found that there is not a sufficient secular
objective in the government’s action.54
In scrutinizing the Counties’ actions, the Supreme Court held that a
reasonable observer would not be able to turn a blind eye to the government’s
religious intention that motivated expanding the earlier displays nor accept the
claim that the Counties had cast off their previous religious objectives in
erecting the subsequent displays.55 Accordingly, the court held that the
Counties’ actions violated the Establishment Clause, because their purpose in
expanding the display was, despite their secular assertions, to keep the Ten
Commandment monuments in the courthouses.56

49. Id. at 860.
50. Id. at 862 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
51. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 862 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290, 308 (2000)).
52. Id. at 864.
53. Id. at 863.
54. Id. at 865. Cf. id. at 902 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that an exclusive purpose to
foster or assist religious practice is not necessarily invalidating).
55. Id. at 869–70.
56. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 873. See also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.
Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009). (noting, in dictum, that “[t]he message that a government entity conveys
by allowing a monument to remain on its property may . . . be altered by the subsequent addition
of other monuments in the same vicinity.”).
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D. Nature and National History of the Monument
On the same day that McCreary County was decided, a different plurality
of the Supreme Court decided another Establishment Clause case involving
religious monuments that further blurred Establishment Clause jurisprudence.57
Van Orden v. Perry involved a challenge to the placement of a monument of
the Ten Commandments, donated by a private organization, on the grounds of
the Texas State Capitol, which also displayed 17 other monuments and 21
historical markers commemorating the “people, ideals, and events that
compose Texan identity.”58
In analyzing the passive display, a plurality of the court held that the
Lemon test is not useful.59 Instead, the plurality indicated that the court’s
analysis should be “driven both by the nature of the monument and by our
Nation’s history.”60 Furthermore, the plurality noted that the Establishment
Clause is not violated if a monument simply has religious content or promotes
a message consistent with religious doctrine.61 Ultimately, the plurality held
that the placement of the Ten Commandments monument did not violate the
Establishment Clause, because the monument served both a religious and
secular purpose by being included in a group of monuments that represented
several strands of Texas’s political and legal history.62
In his concurring and controlling opinion, Justice Breyer indicated that the
context of the passive display must be examined and it must be determined as
to how the text is being used.63 Accordingly, Justice Breyer concluded that the
display of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol
grounds did not infringe the Establishment Clause, because it served a mixed,
but primarily nonreligious, purpose.64
III. REMEDIAL MEASURES TO CURE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATIONS
Governments could avoid several Establishment Clause problems and the
accompanying litigation by merely refraining from erecting monuments and
displays that use religious words and symbols;65 but an aggrieved party is
nonetheless often forced to seek vindication of his religious rights in the
judicial arena. Accordingly, aggrieved parties are forced to seek or must

57. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 681.
59. Id. at 686. The plurality did not opine, however, on the Lemon test’s fate in the larger
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 690.
62. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92.
63. Id. at 700–01 (Breyer, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 703.
65. GREENAWALT, supra note 24, at 69.
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threaten to seek a judicial remedy that is designed to restore them, as nearly as
possible, to the position they would have been in but for the wrong of the other
party.66 Especially, in the constitutional realm, it is important for a remedy to
closely fit the asserted violation.67
A.

Governmental Removal of an Unconstitutional Religious Display

Given that the costs associated with defending an alleged Establishment
Clause violation are often great, governments occasionally seek to avoid these
expenses by removing the alleged infringement on the mere threat of judicial
intervention.68 However, even a government’s decision to remove an alleged
infringement is occasionally challenged on constitutional grounds.69 In
Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County’s decision to remove a
cross from its official Seal was challenged on the ground that the removal was
motivated by the County’s disapproval of, and hostility toward, the Christian
faith.70 However, the County defended the removal by asserting that it was
seeking to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation.71
Agreeing with the County, the Ninth Circuit held that the County’s
decision to remove a potentially infringing symbol or display in order to avoid
an Establishment Clause violation has a secular purpose.72 Additionally, the
court noted that a reasonable observer could not possibly conceive the effect of
the County’s decision to remove the religious symbol from its seal as a
disapproval of, or hostility toward, the associated religious beliefs.73 Instead,
the court determined it was more reasonable that the County’s efforts would be
perceived as an attempt to restore neutrality to its seal and to ensure
compliance with the Establishment Clause.74 Accordingly, the court held the
removal of a religious symbol or display in order to avoid a potential
Establishment Clause violation does not, in itself, violate the Establishment
Clause.75

66. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958).
67. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996).
68. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2007).
69. Id. at 1248.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1255. In perceiving the governmental action as a desire to return to neutrality, as
opposed to hostility towards particular religious beliefs, the Court noted that the removal came
only after the presence of crosses on several other seals had been held unconstitutional. Id. at
1257.
73. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1257.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1258.
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Injunction for Removal of the Unconstitutional Religious Display

An aggrieved party will typically have to seek judicial intervention to
protect its religious rights. Accordingly, when it has been determined that a
permanent religious monument on government property violates the
Establishment Clause, the traditional remedy has been for a court to award an
injunction mandating the monument’s removal.76 However, even these courtmandated removals are occasionally challenged on constitutional grounds.77
In McGinley v. Houston, after the district court issued an injunction
requiring the removal of a monument depicting the Ten Commandments from
the Alabama Supreme Court’s rotunda, the injunction was challenged on the
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause by favoring “a nontheistic
religion/faith.”78 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed this claim as meritless.79
Specifically, the court held that the government’s removal of an
unconstitutional religious monument does not discriminate against the
religious beliefs associated with the monument being removed or favor “a
nontheistic religion/faith”; but, instead, the governmental action was purely
secular.80 The court additionally noted that if this claim had merit “an
Establishment Clause violation could never be cured, because every time a
violation is found and cured by the removal of the statute or practice that cure
itself would violate the Establishment Clause by leaving behind empty
space.”81
C. Sale of Government Property Beneath an Unconstitutional Religious
Monument
Instead of complying with an injunction mandating the removal of an
unconstitutional religious monument on government property, governments
often attempt to remedy the Establishment Clause violation by selling the
monument and the property directly beneath it to a private party.82 Despite this
sale, courts agree that “the presence of a religious symbol on once-public
land. . .may still violate the Establishment Clause.”83 In determining whether
the sale of the monument and property beneath it passes constitutional muster,
the court must, on a transaction by transaction basis, examine “both the form

76. See, e.g., McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2004).
77. See, e.g., id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1332.
80. Id. at 1333.
81. McGinley, 361 F.3d at 1332.
82. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489–
90 (7th Cir. 2000).
83. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 778 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Buono v. Norton, 371
F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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and substance of the transaction to determine whether the governmental action
endorsing religion has actually ceased.”84 However, in analyzing the sale of
the unconstitutional religious monument and the property beneath it, the
United States Circuit Courts are divided on whether the sale is sufficient to end
an Establishment Clause violation.85
1. Presumption of Constitutionality
The Seventh Circuit and a District Court in the Fourth Circuit have held
that “absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective way
for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.”86 These
courts have also noted that this formalistic standard is prone to governmental
manipulation.87 Nevertheless, they have indicated that inquiring into the form
and substance of the transaction is sufficient to determine whether the
governmental endorsement has actually ceased.88 Furthermore, these courts
have held that a governmental decision to sell the monument site to end an
Establishment Clause violation serves a purely secular purpose.89
The Seventh Circuit got its first glimpse of this issue in Freedom from
Religious Foundation v. City of Marshfield, where the City of Marshfield
accepted a statue of Jesus Christ with his arms open in prayer standing atop a
large sphere, which bore the inscription “Christ Guide Us On Our Way.”90
The statue was placed on undeveloped city property and in a manner that made
it visible to travelers on the city’s main highway.91 Marshfield subsequently
developed the property around the statue in order for it to be used as a public
park.92 After much objection to the statue’s presence in the park and
Marshfield’s repeated refusal to remove the statue, suit was filed.93 Shortly

84. Id. at 778–79 (citing City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491).
85. See id. at 779 n.13 (rejecting Seventh Circuit presumption permitting sale or transfer of
land, absent unusual circumstances). See also Respondent’s Brief in Opposition of Certiorari,
Salazar v. Buono, 527 F.3d 758, 778 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (U.S. Feb. 23,
2009) (No. 08-472) (asking the Supreme Court “[w]hether, after a court has held that the presence
of a sectarian religious symbol on government land violates the Establishment Clause, the transfer
of that land perpetuates the Establishment Clause violation. . . .”).
86. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles 395 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting City
of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D.
Md. 2005) (quoting same). These courts assert that the Establishment Clause violation ends when
the property is sold, because the post-sale display represents the expression of the private
purchaser, not of the government. See, e.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
87. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 700.
88. Id. (quoting City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491).
89. See id. at 705; Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
90. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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thereafter, Marshfield erected a disclaimer that indicated the presence of the
statue does not reflect an endorsement of the associated religious message.94
Subsequently, Marshfield sold the property beneath the statue to a private party
who held views consistent with the monument’s message.95
In analyzing the sale, the Seventh Circuit agreed with Marshfield’s
contention that the sale of the property effectively ended Marshfield’s religious
expression, because the property owner was in exclusive control of the
expression that takes place on the property after the sale.96 Furthermore,
because the price was fair and because the necessary formalities required by
state law were performed to consummate the sale, the court concluded that
there were no extraordinary circumstances that evinced that the city endorsed a
religion by deciding to sell the property to a religious organization.97
However, the court concluded that the sale failed to end the perception of
government endorsement and granted the private purchaser preferential access
to the city’s park, because the private property was not visibly differentiated
from the city’s park in any sufficient way.98 In dicta, the court indicated that,
in order to end the perception of endorsement, the city should erect a structure
that clearly defines the private property and should maintain a clearly visible
disclaimer.99
The Seventh Circuit got another look at the issue five years later in
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, where the City of LaCrosse granted the
Fraternal Order of Eagles permission to erect a monument of the Ten
Commandments in a public park.100 After the city’s approval to erect the
monument, the city was inundated by severe flooding, and the monument was
ultimately dedicated to those who helped during the flood.101 After the
monument was unveiled, the city refused multiple requests to remove the
monument and to move it to a private location.102 Instead, without a public

94. Id.
95. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490. The statue was originally donated by the Knights of
Columbus and was ultimately sold to the Henry Praschak Memorial Fund, Inc. Id. at 489–90.
Henry Praschak was a member of the Knights of Columbus and helped with the development of
the park. Id. at 489.
96. Id. at 491. As a result of the sale, Marshfield no longer owns the property on which the
religious expression occurs and, therefore, the sale ended Marshfield’s religious expression and
cured any Establishment Clause violations. Id.
97. Id. at 492–93.
98. Id. at 497.
99. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497 (indicating that installing a permanent fence or wall
would be sufficient to clearly express that the speech was expressive conduct of the private
owner).
100. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2005).
101. Id. at 696.
102. Id.
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offering, the city sold the property beneath the monument to the Eagles.103
Upon taking possession of the property, the Eagles erected a fence around the
monument and a disclaimer, which indicated that the property was privately
owned and the religious beliefs associated with the monument were those of
the Eagles.104
Despite the city offering the property solely to the original donor, an entity
that had demonstrated its willingness to preserve the monument, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the city’s decision to sell the property was motivated by the
purely secular intention to end a perceived endorsement.105 The court
ultimately concluded that there were no unusual circumstances to call into
question the constitutionality of the sale; and, therefore, the sale of the property
effectively ended the Establishment Clause violation.106 Additionally, the
court noted that the extensive efforts taken to sell the property, erect a fence,
and display signs would overcome a reasonable observer’s perception that the
religious message of the monument was being endorsed by the city.107
In Chambers v. City of Fredrick, a stone copy of the Ten Commandments
was placed in one of Fredrick’s public parks, in a manner that made it visible
from one of the city’s main roads.108 In light of the growing controversies
surrounding the constitutionality of the monument, the local Fraternal Order of
Eagles, which donated the monument to Fredrick, offered to purchase all or
part of the grounds upon which the monument rested.109 After the city decided
that it would be in its best interest to sell the property beneath the monument,
three additional offers to purchase the property were received and several
additional bids were solicited.110 However, despite the fact that the Eagles did
not submit the highest bid, the property was sold to the Eagles upon the city’s
determination that it was the logical and best bidder to maintain the
property.111 The sale was subsequently challenged on the ground that it failed
to ameliorate the Establishment Clause violation, because the transaction was a
sham designed to permit the continued display of the monument.112

103. Id. at 697.
104. Id.
105. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705.
106. Id. at 701–03 (indicating, in dicta, that unusual circumstances would be (1) “a sale that
did not comply with applicable state law governing the sale of land by a municipality,” (2) “a sale
to a straw purchaser that left the City with continuing power to exercise the duties of ownership,”
or (3) “a sale well below fair market value resulting in a gift to a religious organization”).
107. Id. at 703–04.
108. Chambers v. City of Fredrick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569–70 (D. Md. 2005).
109. Id. at 570 (the sale of the property also included the land beneath an additional
monument that included the names of individuals buried on the grounds).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 571–72.
112. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

314

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX:301

Adhering to the presumption articulated by the Seventh Circuit, the court
determined that, despite the fact that the city failed to adhere to local
requirements for the sale of public land and failed to award the property to the
highest bidder, there were no unusual circumstances to make the sale of the
property suspect.113 Although the monument’s location might convey the
impression to a passerby that Fredrick is endorsing its message, the court
concluded that a reasonable observer would understand that the property was
sold to dissociate Fredrick with any message the monument conveys.114
Accordingly, the court determined that a reasonable observer would take
comfort in the fact that the Eagles, being the original owner of the monument,
was the logical purchaser for the property and would not conclude that the sale
was intended to advance the religion associated with the monument.115
Accordingly, the court held that the sale of the property and the monument’s
continued display did not infringe the Establishment Clause.116
2. Rejecting the Presumption
In the most recent challenge to a sale of property beneath an
unconstitutional religious display, the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the
approach followed by the other circuits, indicated that the substance of a
transaction for the sale of government property beneath an unconstitutional
religious display must be analyzed on a transaction-by-transaction basis to
determine whether the Establishment Clause violation has actually ceased.117
However, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt the presumption that a sale of
government property is an effective cure to the Establishment Clause
violation.118 Instead, the Ninth Circuit noted that, typically, “constitutional
violations are not presumptively cured when control is transferred from public
to private hands.”119

113. Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
114. Id. at 573. The court’s analysis dubiously indicates that it is irrelevant to a reasonable
observer, who is “aware of the history and context” of the display, that the procedures for selling
public property were not adhered to nor was the property conveyed to the individual with the
highest bid. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008).
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (“Where the tradition of
municipal control had become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere
substitution of trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector.”);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (lack of formal public control over election primary
“immaterial” to analysis of constitutional violation)).
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In Buono v. Kempthorne,120 an eight-foot Latin cross, which rests atop
“Sunrise Rock” in the Mojave National Preserve, was challenged on the
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause.121 After a request to
construct a Buddhist shrine near the cross was denied, the National Park
Service (“NPS”) announced its intention to remove the cross.122 However,
upon notice of the NPS’s intentions, the United States Congress passed a series
of laws designed to preserve the cross’s display.123
Shortly before a panel of the Ninth Circuit heard and affirmed the district
court’s permanent injunction, Congress enacted a final bill that authorized a
land exchange for the area directly beneath and immediately surrounding the
cross with the original donor, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”).124
Undeterred by the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the injunction, the
government began moving forward with the proposed land exchange.125
However, after motions were filed, the district court ordered the government to
comply with the permanent injunction and prohibited implementation of the
land exchange.126 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the land
exchange was an attempt to evade the injunction by scrutinizing three aspects
of the exchange: “(1) the government’s continuing oversight and rights in the
site containing the cross after the proposed land exchange; (2) the method for

120. 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08472).
121. Id. at 768. A wooden cross was first erected at this location by the Veterans of Foreign
Wars. This controversy spawned when the National Parks Service denied the request of an
individual seeking to build a Buddhist shrine near the cross. Id. at 769.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 769. In December 2000, Congress passed its first piece of legislation, which
prohibited the use of government funds to remove the cross. Id. In March 2001, suit was filed in
district court challenging the constitutionality of the cross’s continued presence in the Preserve.
Id. at 770. However, while suit was pending and before the district court was able to determine
whether the continued display of the cross violated the Establishment Clause, Congress
designated the cross a “national memorial commemorating [the] United States participation in
World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war.” Id. (quoting Department of
Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278-79
(2002) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2002)). Subsequently, the district court issued a
permanent injunction prohibiting the continued display of the cross. Id. at 771. In response,
Congress passed a bill prohibiting federal funds from being used to dismantle any national
monuments commemorating the United States’ participation in World War I. Id. (quoting
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551
(2003)).
124. Id. at 771 (citing Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-87, §
8121, 117 Stat. 1100 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410 (2003)).
125. Buono, 527 F.3d at 773.
126. Id.
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effectuating the land exchange; and (3) the history of the government’s efforts
to preserve the cross.”127
First, in analyzing the role the government would play in the continued
oversight of the property after the exchange, the court held that the
government’s ongoing supervision, maintenance, and oversight responsibilities
coupled with its reversionary interest permitted it to retain substantial rights
and control over the property despite the transfer of ownership to the VFW.128
Next, the court noted that method of sale was peculiar, because the land
exchange was made by Congress without holding a hearing and was deeply
buried in an appropriations bill.129 It was also noted that Congress transferred
the land without holding a public auction or notice and transferred the land to
the monument’s original donor, who had a “significant interest and personal
investment in preserving the cross that had been ordered removed.”130 The
court concluded that these facts demonstrate that the government had an
unusual role in the transaction and provided additional evidence that the
government was attempting to circumvent the injunction.131 Lastly, the court
indicated that the government’s efforts to preserve the display of the cross
were “herculean” and led to the “undeniable conclusion that the government’s
[purpose] was to keep the cross in place.”132 Accordingly, the court held that
the land exchange was merely a ploy designed to circumvent the injunction
and keep the Latin cross in place.133
The Ninth Circuit also analyzed whether the improper endorsement of
religion ceased as a result of the land exchange.134 A reasonable observer, the
court noted, would undoubtedly be aware of “the governmental attempts to
preserve [the cross] and its denial of access to other religious symbols.”135
Accordingly, the court held that the land exchange was an improper
endorsement of religion, enjoined the government from effectuating the land

127. Id. at 779.
128. Id. at 779, 781. “NPS retains overall management and supervision of the Preserve. NPS
is responsible for ‘the supervision, management, and control’ of national memorials…The
transfer of land to the VFW is conditioned on the VFW’s maintenance of the conveyed property
as a memorial to World War I veterans. The Secretary must carry out its duties under § 8137,
which provides $10,000 for NPS to acquire and install replicas of the original cross and plaque.
The property ‘shall revert’ to government ownership if ‘it is no longer being maintained as a war
memorial.’” Id. at 779.
129. Id. at 781.
130. Buono, 527 F.3d at 781.
131. Id. at 781–82.
132. Id. at 782.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Buono, 527 F.3d at 782–83.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009] SELLING THE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY BENEATH A RELIGIOUS MONUMENT

317

exchange, and required the government to comply with the original injunction
requiring the removal of the cross.136
IV. ANALYSIS
When the government transacts to sell a religious monument that violates
the Establishment Clause and the property beneath the monument, the
transaction typically grants the property owner exclusive control over the use
of the property and, thus, arguably ends any Establishment Clause violation.137
However, despite the sale, a religious monument’s presence on once-public
land may be problematic.138 In analyzing these transactions, most courts rely
on the illogical presumption that these sales are constitutional. Furthermore,
the manner in which the courts have analyzed the circumstances surrounding
these transactions is insufficient to protect against even the most blatant
manipulations. In fact, most of the transactions analyzed by courts are
problematic and infringe not only the principles of the Establishment Clause,
but also the Free Speech and the Equal Protection Clauses. Additionally, when
the government decides to sell its property after a court has issued an order
mandating the monument’s removal, the government’s action amounts to
contempt for the court’s inherent powers.
A.

Presumption

Most courts have adopted the presumption that a sale of the government’s
property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument is sufficient to end an
Establishment Clause violation, unless “unusual circumstances” are present.139
These courts expressly note that this standard is highly susceptible to
manipulation.140 However, they are confident that scrutinizing the form and
substance of these transactions will enable it to sufficiently decipher whether
the Establishment Clause violation has ceased.141
In light of the circumstances that typically surround a sale of an
unconstitutional religious monument and the government property beneath it,
the presumption is insufficient to protect religious equality. First, the mere fact
that a sale is being conducted should draw into question the veracity of the
136. Id. at 782–83.
137. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.
2000). See also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 786 (1995)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[A]n unattended display (and any message it conveys) can naturally be
viewed as belonging to the owner of the lane on which it stands.”).
138. See, e.g., Buono, 527 F.3d at 778.
139. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2005); City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491; Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md.
2005).
140. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
141. Id.
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government’s asserted secular purpose. Suspicion should arise from the
government’s decision to forgo removing the monument and, instead, design a
transaction that virtually guarantees the monument’s continued display.
Additionally, unlike a transaction for sale, a decision to remove the monument
is not susceptible to manipulation and ends the Establishment Clause violation
without an adverse impact on the constitutional rights of others.142 Second,
since the government property is typically only offered for sale when threats of
removal emerge, the sale appears to be a non-remedial measure designed to
preserve the display of the monument and to avoid the commands of the
Establishment Clause.143 Finally, because the government has previously
granted a religious organization preferential access to display its monument,
courts should be skeptic of its later decision to sell a part of its public park to
these same organizations. In fact, a government that has previously granted a
preference to a religious monument should not be presumed to act within the
bounds of the Constitution when it has opted to sell its property as opposed to
merely removing the monument. In dealing with a right as sacred as religious
freedom, more caution is necessary than a “formalistic standard” that runs a
high risk of manipulation.
Nevertheless, courts heavily rely on the presumption that the sale ends an
Establishment Clause violation. In fact, sales are typically upheld on the
complainant’s inability to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the
transaction are unusual.144 While this presumption correctly recognizes the
need for a fact-intensive inquiry into a government’s decision to sell its
property,145 the typical factors that could rebut the presumption, as applied by
the courts, have proven trivial and insufficient to protect against even the most
blatant manipulations.
One of the initial factors courts analyze when scrutinizing a sale is whether
the transaction conforms to state and local law for the sale of public

142. Id. at 491–92.
143. The presumption appears to be endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed to sell off
patches of government land to various religious denominations as a means of circumventing the
Establishment Clause. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702. In the unlikely event that a monument that
carried a message which the administrator of the public forum disagreed with, the administrator
would undoubtedly remove the monument as opposed to selling the property. This evinces the
great need for these transactions to be viewed in a suspicious light.
144. See id. at 703 (indicating that the circumstances “do not entail the ‘unusual
circumstances’ that would otherwise override the type of legitimate sale approved by [City of]
Marshfield”); Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (upholding the constitutionality of a sale where
the city failed to comply with its procedural requirements for the sale of public land and did not
award the sale to the highest bidder; instead subjectively determined that the original donor was
the only bidder that would be able to comply with the covenants and take care of the monument
property).
145. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702.
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property.146 Adherence to state and local law is often used by courts to
demonstrate the legitimacy of the sale;147 however, courts have failed to even
question a sale when the government fails to adhere to local laws or
procedures.148 Furthermore, when the government permits—or accepts—bids
from multiple entities to purchase the property, courts have failed to become
suspicious of a government’s decision to sell the property to the original donor
of the monument, despite the submission of higher bids.149
Merely looking to whether a government complied with state or local law
is insufficient to analyze the legitimacy of a transaction because often no
alternative bids are permitted enabling the government to select and sell its
property to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness to preserve the
monument.150 By failing to permit other bids, the government can effectively
alleviate the risk of the sale going to a bidder that will remove or change the
monument.151 However, despite this blatant manipulation, courts have failed
to deem the exclusive offering as an unusual enough circumstance to call into
question the legitimacy of the transaction.152
Third, courts often inspect the deed of sale to ensure that the government
does not retain rights that would permit it to exert extensive control over the
property or the manner in which it is subsequently used.153 Particularly, courts
analyze whether there is a restrictive covenant or a reversionary clause that
prohibits the purchaser from exercising the rights typically held by a property
owner.154 However, courts are hardly suspicious of a transaction even when a
restrictive covenant that mandates that the property be used in a particular

146. See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492.
147. See id. (the sale of the property complied with the applicable state law); Mercier, 395
F.3d at 702 (the sale complied with state law).
148. See Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
149. See id. (noting that the original donor bid less for the property than other bidders).
150. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (Congress did not open the
bidding to the general public, but directed the land to be transferred to the original donor, who has
actively sought to preserve the cross’s display); Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702–03 (City offered the
property exclusively to the original donor of the monument); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489–
92 (City did not solicit alternative bids, but sold to an organization commemorating a member of
the organization that donated the monument).
151. When the government permits only a single bidder, the fact that the sale complies with
state or local law seems to become irrelevant to the courts. See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at
492.
152. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702–03 (finding no unusual circumstances, despite fact that the
property was offered solely to the original donor); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492–93
(finding no unusual circumstances despite fact that no alternative bids were solicited).
153. Buono, 527 F.3d at 781; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492.
154. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 780 (government retained a reversionary interest that triggers if
the property is not being used in a particular manner); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492 (a
restrictive covenant was included in the deed of sale limiting the purchaser’s use of the property).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

320

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX:301

manner is included in the deed of sale.155 In fact, only after a court disregarded
the presumption of constitutionality has a reversionary clause, which set forth
the manner in which the property was to be used post-sale, cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the sale.156
Fourth, some courts consider the location of the property being sold as
relevant.157 However, attempting to distinguish public parks from other
government property is futile for the determination of whether the sale
sufficiently ends an Establishment Clause violation. Specifically, a legitimate
sale of government property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument
requires governmental action that sufficiently distances the government from
the monument’s message. Accordingly, beyond the determination of whether
the sale of the location is permissible under state or local law, the location of
the property is irrelevant for the determination of whether the government is
distancing itself from the monument’s message.158
Finally, courts often scrutinize the price at which the government sells its
property.159 Comparing the fair market price of the property and the
transaction price is required to ensure that the transaction price is reasonable
and not merely a gift to the purchasing party.160 Although courts frequently
use the selling price to evince the legitimacy of the sale, courts rarely analyze a
transaction where the price of sale was shown to be below the fair market
value.161 However, by failing to select the highest bid to purchase the

155. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492 (noting that the deed of sale included a restrictive
covenant, which limited the use of the property to public park purposes). The court indicates that
a restrictive covenant does not void a transaction for the sale of land under state law. Id.
Additionally, the court held that because the City has made no effort to enforce the covenant, the
court need not analyze whether it constitutes a perpetuation of the endorsement of religion. Id. at
492–93.
156. Buono, 527 F.3d at 781.
157. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703 (noting that the property sold is not near or in any
governmental building, but is merely a public park).
158. Instead, the location of the property in question is relevant only for the threshold
determination of whether the religious monument violates the Establishment Clause, not whether
the violation has or can be remedied through sale. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598 n.48 (1989) (holding that crèche’s location in prominent
location resulted in an unconstitutional endorsement); O’Connor v. Washburn University, 416
F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that location of monument weighted toward a finding
of state endorsement).
159. See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492; Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702.
160. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492.
161. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702 (noting that the purchaser paid the market rate, as
determined by the City Assessor), City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492 (noting that the purchaser
paid a fair market price for the land). Cf. Annunziato v. New Haven Bd. Of Aldermen, 555
F.Supp 427, 433 (D. Conn. 1982) (finding that a sale of property to a church for $1, $29,999
below market value, constitutes a gift of the remainder of the market value in violation of the
Establishment Clause).
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property, a government is arguably selecting a price below fair market value.162
Nevertheless, a court has indicated that such action is not an unusual
circumstance that warrants questioning the legitimacy of the transaction.163
Because of its susceptibility for manipulation and the inability of courts to
apply factors to sufficiently scrutinize these transactions, the presumption of
constitutionality is insufficient to protect religious equality and, therefore,
should be rejected.164 Instead, given the suspicious nature of a government’s
decision to sell the government property beneath an unconstitutional religious
monument, courts should presume that the sale is insufficient to end the
Establishment Clause violation. However, the government’s decision to sell a
religious monument that violates the Establishment Clause as well as the
property beneath it and the presence of any of the above factors might infringe
the principles of the Establishment, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses.
B.

Establishment Clause
1. Purpose for the Sale

A government’s decision to sell a monument that violates the
Establishment Clause and the property directly beneath it has not been
satisfactorily analyzed in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.165 As
the Supreme Court indicated in McCreary County, the purpose of government
action must be scrutinized when “an understanding of official objective
Accordingly, although a
emerges from readily discoverable fact.”166
government proclamation that the sale is designed to end an Establishment
Clause violation is undoubtedly secular and entitled to deference, this secular

162. For a definition of fair market value, see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (8th ed.
2004) (“The price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open
market and in an arm’s-length transaction.”). Arguably, when individuals bid to purchase a piece
of property, the highest price a buyer is willing to pay to a seller would be the fair market value.
The fair market value of the property, however, could be determined by an independent appraisal.
163. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–73 (D. Md. 2005) (noting that
purchaser did not submit the highest bid but was the original donor and determined by the city to
be the most prepared to maintain the property).
164. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the Seventh
Circuit’s presumption permitting sale or transfer of land absent unusual circumstances).
165. The Supreme Court has recently been petitioned to decide whether the transfer of
government property beneath a religious monument that has been held to violate the
Establishment Clause perpetuates the violation. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition of
Certiorari at 2, Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S. filed July 27, 2009). Van Orden is not helpful
in determining whether a government’s decision to sell a monument that violates the
Establishment Clause and the property beneath it is constitutional, because it was designed only
to scrutinize a monument. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (noting that a
court’s analysis of a monument should be driven both by its nature and by our nation’s history).
166. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).
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purpose cannot be secondary to a religious objective.167 Despite the
government’s asserted secular purpose, when the government offers the sale
exclusively to an entity that will undoubtedly preserve the monument, the
“openly available data” supports the commonsense conclusion that a
predominately religious objective permeates from the government’s actions.168
When the government changes the circumstances surrounding an
unconstitutional religious monument by selling it and the property beneath it,
the government’s primary purpose is to prevent the removal of the
monument.169 Although a government is not prohibited from selling or closing
a public forum,170 it is impermissible for the government to manipulate the
forum by selling only the property beneath the unconstitutional religious
monument to individuals that have demonstrated their willingness to preserve
the monument. By selling only the property beneath the monument the
government changes only the form necessary to remove the monument from
the commands of the Establishment Clause, however the substance of the
endorsement remains intact. Additionally, the sale of such a minuscule piece
of property in the midst of a public park essentially prohibits the purchaser
from any other effective use besides displaying the monument. Therefore, in
order to alleviate the only remaining threats, that the purchaser may remove or
change the monument, the government offers the property solely to an entity
that has demonstrated its willingness to preserve the monument.171
Accordingly, when the government decides to offer its property exclusively to
such an organization, the government’s primary objective is unmistakably to
preserve the monument.172 Similarly, the government demonstrates its primary
objective of preserving the monument when it accepts or solicits additional

167. See id. at 864.
168. Id. at 863.
169. See id. at 881 (finding that the predominate purpose of attempting to keep the
monuments on display in the courthouse was undoubtedly religious).
170. See Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009), remanded, 319 F. App’x 753 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that a
government may change the physical nature of its property in order to close a public forum).
171. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d. 758, 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (Congress did not open the
bidding to the general public but directed the land to be transferred to the original donor who had
actively sought to preserve the cross’s display); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d
693, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2005) (City offered the property exclusively to the original donor of the
monument); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th
Cir. 2000) (City did not solicit alternative bids but sold to an organization commemorating a
member of the organization that donated the monument).
172. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 781–82 (holding that the exclusion of other purchasers and the
selection of a beneficiary of the land exchange with a significant interest in preserving the cross
evinces that the entity was a straw purchaser).
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bids for the property, but selects, despite higher bids, an entity that will
undoubtedly preserve the display of the monument.173
As the Supreme Court noted in McCreary County, the display is to be
viewed in light of the progression leading to its final status.174 Accordingly, a
“reasonable observer” would be unable to turn a blind eye to several
circumstances that took place before the monument came to rest on private
land. Particularly, in the wake of a determination that the display of the
religious monument is unconstitutional, a reasonable observer would be
suspicious of the government’s decision to end an Establishment Clause
violation by taking a number of painstaking steps to sell the property, in lieu of
simply removing the monument. In light of this information, a reasonable
observer would suspect that the government is favoring the religious message
associated with the monument it seeks to preserve.175 Additionally, upon the
realization that the sale was designed in a manner which virtually guarantees
the continued display of the monument, a reasonable observer would be unable
to accept the government’s asserted secular purpose.176 In fact, the reasonable
observer would likely draw the commonsense conclusion that the government
is either endorsing the monument’s religious message or being controlled by
the monument’s religious adherents.
Either way the circumstances
demonstrate that the government is willing to take any and all steps necessary
to preserve the monument’s display.
In McCreary County, the Supreme Court held that the Counties’ ploy, to
circumvent the Establishment Clause and prevent removal of the
unconstitutionally religious monuments by adding additional monuments to
change the complexion of the display, violated the Establishment Clause.177
Similarly, a governmental decision to sell the property beneath an
unconstitutional religious monument to an entity that will undoubtedly
preserve the monument is unconstitutional. By changing the circumstances
surrounding the monument’s display, the government attempts to not only
avoid its removal, but also to preserve its display.178 Unfortunately, the world

173. See id.
174. See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 868 (2005).
175. See id. at 873.
176. See id. at 866.
177. Id. at 848, 856–57.
178. Compare Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d. 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Congress enacted
legislation requiring the Secretary of the Interior to convey the land beneath the cross to the
VFW. . . .”), and Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570–71 (D. Md. 2005)
(City sold the parcel of land where the monument is located), and Mercier v. Fraternal Order of
Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (City sold the land under and immediately surrounding
the monument), and Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487,
490 (7th Cir. 2000) (City sold the portion of the land on which the statue stands), with McCreary
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cannot be made anew every morning, and the “implausible claim that
governmental purpose has changed should not carry the day in a court of law
any more than in a head with common sense.”179 The phenomenal efforts
taken to sell the property, in lieu of removal, convey the unmistakable
impression that the government is willing to take any steps necessary to
prevent the removal of the monument.180 Furthermore, a government’s
decision to award the property to an organization that will undoubtedly
preserve the monument evinces the government’s religious purpose behind the
sale. Accordingly, when the government sells its property in a manner
designed to ensure the continued display of an unconstitutional religious
monument, the governmental action appears to infringe the Establishment
Clause.
2. Continuing Governmental Endorsement of Religion
Courts agree that “the presence of a religious symbol on once public
land . . . may still violate the Establishment Clause.”181 Typically, if the
government sells the property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument,
the subsequent display of the monument is arguably the private expression of
the purchaser.182 However, if the government maintains any significant control
over the use of the post-sale property 183 or if the property is not visibly
distinguished from the surrounding public property,184 the sale may constitute a
perpetuation of the Establishment Clause violation.
When a reversionary clause or a restrictive covenant is placed in the deed
of sale, it draws into question the government’s argument that the post-sale
display of the monument is private speech.185 A reversionary clause or a
restrictive covenant is an effective way for the government to control the postsale use of the property. 186 Therefore, when the government requires the

County, 545 U.S. at 856–57 (Counties added additional framed documents to the display
containing the Ten Commandments).
179. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866, 874.
180. Id. at 869–70.
181. Buono, 527 F.3d at 778. See also City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 496.
182. See Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 786 (1995)
(Souter, J., concurring).
183. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 779 (suggesting that the government’s oversight and rights in a
site after the exchange must be analyzed).
184. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490.
185. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 781 (holding that supervisory responsibilities with a reversionary
interest permits the government to retain important property rights).
186. See id. (holding that a reversionary interest will show the government’s ongoing control
over the property and the parties will conduct themselves accordingly); Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (holding that even in private hands, a park may not be operated for the
public on a segregated basis if the private owners are nothing more than a trustee); Eaton v.
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 714 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that a reversionary clause in deed permitted
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purchaser to use the property in a particular manner, the post-sale expression
on the property is arguably not the sole expression of the purchaser.187
Additionally, a deed of sale that permits the government to retain the rights to
supervise, manage, or control the property indicates that the transaction was
merely a sham to avoid the commands of the Establishment Clause.188
Arguably the reasonable observer would construe a sale with restrictions
placed on the use of the property as a scam to enable the government to
continue the display of the monument. Accordingly, it is likely that a
restriction on post-sale use would be a perpetuation of the Establishment
Clause violation.
Regardless of whether the government retains any control over the postsale use of the property, courts have indicated that the purchased property must
be visibly differentiated from the surrounding public property.189 In order to
end a perception of government endorsement after the sale, courts have
required that the purchased property be differentiated from the public property
by constructing both a structure that clearly defines the private property or a
clearly visible disclaimer.190 Accordingly, if the government fails to
distinguish the purchased property from the surrounding public property the
display of the continued monument will be perceived as a continued
governmental endorsement.191
3. Government Action With the Effect of Advancing Religion
The Establishment Clause requires that when a government acts, “its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.”192 Government action violates Lemon’s effect prong if “irrespective
of the government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a

the City to exercise control of the facility to make sure it was being used in a certain way);
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322–23 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that inclusion of
a reversionary clause in the deed of sale for a segregated golf course permitted the government to
exercise “complete present control” over the use of the property).
187. It is irrelevant whether or not the government has attempted to enforce the provision
restricting use because its mere presence is sufficient to ensure compliance. Cf. City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492–93.
188. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 779, 781. If, however, the government is given responsibilities
for compensation of a lesser degree, such as up-keep of the property, the responsibilities might be
insufficient to draw into question the legitimacy of the sale.
189. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494–95.
190. Id. at 497 (indicating that installing a permanent fence or wall would be sufficient to
clearly express that the speech was expressive conduct of the private owner).
191. Although such action might be sufficient to end the perception of government
endorsement, it might not be sufficient to remove the post-sale property from the commands of
the Free Speech Clause. See infra notes 237–57 and accompanying text.
192. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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message of endorsement or disapproval.”193
However, a religious
organization’s enjoyment of “incidental” benefits does not violate this
prohibition against advancing religion.194 Accordingly, when “a reasonable
person could perceive that a government action conveys a message that
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred, the
Establishment Clause has been violated.”195
Courts have consistently held that when the government sells its property
beneath an unconstitutional religious monument, a reasonable observer would
perceive the government’s action as an attempt to dissociate itself from the
message conveyed by the monument.196 However, a reasonable observer
would undoubtedly be aware that the government could have dissociated itself
from the monument’s message by merely removing the monument. This
realization alone would demonstrate to a reasonable observer that the
monument’s continued presence is not “incidental.” Furthermore, a reasonable
observer would note that the government has denied access to other religious
monuments.197 These circumstances indicate that, even if inadvertently, the
government views the message in a favorable light, because it decided to
present an opportunity that might enable the monument to avoid removal.198
Regardless, when a reasonable observer notes that the property is being
offered exclusively to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness to
preserve the monument, the sale conveys the unmistakable belief that the
government favors the monument’s particular religion, even if that is not the
government’s purpose.199 Similarly, when the government selects a bidder that
will undoubtedly preserve the monument, despite receiving higher bids, the
sale conveys the appearance of government favoritism regardless of actual
Accordingly, a reasonable observer would perceive the
purpose.200
government’s decision to sell its property, and the manner in which it
effectuated the sale, as a manipulation of a public forum that is unmistakably
193. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
194. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
195. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (D. Md. 2005) (citing City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 493).
196. Id.; Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005).
197. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2008) (government did not
open the bidding for the property to the general public); Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702-03, 705; City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492, 496 (City did not solicit alternate bids for the property); Chambers,
373 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73.
198. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 772.
199. See id. at 781 (government did not open the bidding for the property to the general
public); Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703 (property was solely offered to the Eagles); City of Marshfield,
203 F.3d at 492 (City did not solicit alternate bids for the property). See also Chambers, 373 F.
Supp. 2d at 572 (the City awarded the property to the original donor although its bid was smaller
than those of its competitors).
200. Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73.
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an advancement of the religious message associated with the monument,
regardless of the government’s actual purpose.
C. Free Speech Clause
“[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”201
Undeniably, private religious speech receives as much protection under the
Free Speech Clause as does secular private speech.202 However, speech that is
protected from governmental suppression is not thereby guaranteed a forum on
all property belonging to the government.203 Instead, the right to use
governmental property for private expression turns on the nature of the
property.204
1. Governmental Speech Doctrine
The Free Speech Clause was designed by the Framers to restrict the
government in its regulation of private speech.205 In contrast, the “government
speech doctrine” provides that when the government speaks on its own behalf,
its speech is not subject to the commands of the Free Speech Clause.206 The
government speech doctrine also applies when the government “receives
assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a governmentcontrolled message.”207 Therefore, in order to fall within the purview of the
government speech doctrine, it is vital that the government controls the
message being conveyed.208
Though it is not subject to the commands of the Free Speech Clause,
government speech is not necessarily free from all restraints.209 Government
speech undoubtedly must conform to the Constitution’s prescriptions;
specifically, the Establishment and the Equal Protection Clauses.210
Government speech may also be restrained by laws limiting public official’s
ability to engage in advocacy.211 Finally, the government or government

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
Id. at 761.
Id.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1131.
Id. at 1132, 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1132.
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officials that engage in advocacy will be held accountable by its constituents
and subjected to the political process.212
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,213 the Supreme Court indicated that
“[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property typically represent
government speech[,]” but also noted that there are situations in which it may
be difficult to determine whether the government is speaking on its own behalf
or merely providing a forum for private speech.214 The Court additionally
noted that property owners will not permit the installation of permanent
monuments on their property when they do not agree with the message that the
monument conveys.215 Accordingly, the Court held that when the government
accepts a permanent monument and subsequently places it in a public park, the
permanent monument constitutes government speech.216
When the government has accepted a permanent monument that is found to
violate the Establishment Clause and subsequently sells the monument and the
property beneath it, the government speech doctrine appears to be inapplicable
to the analysis of the post-sale monument.217 In categorizing a permanent
monument as governmental speech, the Court looks to whether the private
rights possessed by the monument’s donor have been relinquished.218
Typically, the private rights of the monument’s donor are relinquished when
the government accepts a privately donated monument and displays it in a
public park.219 However, in his concurring opinion in Pleasant Grove City,
Justice Souter indicated that this presumption is faulty and there are some

212. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000)) (“If the citizenry objects [to the governmental message], newly elected officials . . . could
espouse some different or contrary position.”). However, if the government sells the property to a
non-governmental entity, newly elected officials will not be able to reverse the action if the
constituents disagree with the message being advocated.
213. In Pleasant Grove City, the City placed a monument of the Ten Commandments, among
other monuments, in Pioneer Park. Id. at 1129. Summum, a religious organization, repetitively
sought to erect its own monument containing “the Seven Aphorisms of Summum.” Id. However,
the City denied the requests indicating that it only accepted monuments that directly relate to the
history of the City or from groups with longstanding ties to the community. Id. at 1130.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Summum’s Free Speech rights were not violated by the
City’s decision to accept a monument of the Ten Commandments, while rejecting Summum’s
monument, which is best perceived as a form of government speech, and, thus, not subject to the
Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1138.
214. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (emphasis added). See also id. at 1141 (Souter,
J., concurring) (noting that “accepting the position that public monuments are government speech
categorically” is problematic).
215. Id. at 1133.
216. Id. at 1134.
217. See Freedom from Religion Found, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th
Cir. 2005).
218. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).
219. Id. at 1136.
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instances when governmental maintenance of monuments is not government
speech at all.220 Instead, he indicated that the best way to identify whether a
permanent monument is government speech, as opposed to private speech, is to
view the monument through the eyes of a reasonable observer.221
Under either the majority or the concurrence’s approach in Pleasant Grove
City, when the government sells the monument, it would not likely be
perceived as government speech but would instead be perceived as the speech
of the subsequent purchaser. Specifically, when a permanent monument is
placed in a public park and is subsequently sold back to the private donor, or
some other non-government entity, the monument represents the speech of the
purchaser, because the private entity has property rights in the monument.
Even when viewed pursuant to Justice Souter’s proposed analysis, the
permanent monument would constitute private speech because a reasonable
observer would know that the monument was originally donated to the
government and was subsequently sold to a private entity in an attempt to
remedy the Establishment Clause violation. Furthermore, because the
government speech doctrine is limited by the Establishment Clause, the
monument cannot constitute government speech after it is sold to a
nongovernment entity if it can arguably be perceived as a remedy to the
Establishment Clause violation. This notion is furthered by the requirement
that disclaimer signs be constructed near the monument after the sale to
indicate that the monument represents the expression of a private entity and
that the government is not affiliated with the message.222 Accordingly, by
selling the permanent monument to a private entity, the permanent monument
arguably becomes the private speech of the purchaser and might be subject to
the commands of the Free Speech Clause.
2. Forum Analysis
The existence of a right of access to public property and the standards by
which limitations on such access are evaluated depend on the nature of the
property at issue.223 In analyzing whether the government’s restriction of
private speech on government property is permissible, the Supreme Court has
recognized three types of forums: traditional public forums, designated public
forums, and nonpublic forums.224 However, the Supreme Court indicated in
Pleasant Grove City that forum analysis is applicable only to those instances
where the government-owned property is capable of “accommodating a large
number of public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. See supra notes 40–45.
See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2005).
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
Id. at 45–46.
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or the program.”225 Unlike long-winded speakers, persons distributing leaflets
and picketers carrying their signs, the Court noted that permanent monuments
forever endure and do not go home.226
The Pleasant Grove City Court also noted that if public parks were
considered traditional public forums for the purpose of erecting privately
donated monuments, most parks would be required to refuse all donations.227
Additionally, the Court noted that there is no “long tradition” of allowing
individuals to permanently occupy public space with any type of monument.228
The Pleasant Grove City Court went on to distinguish Capitol Square, which
involved the temporary display of private monuments in public parks, on the
ground that the monuments were merely temporary and would permit the
accommodation of several speakers without an influx of clutter.229 Ultimately,
the Pleasant Grove City Court generally concluded that “forum analysis does
not apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public property.”230
While the Pleasant Grove City Court correctly stated that the forum
doctrine has been applied only to those instances where the government is
capable of accommodating large number of public speakers without defeating
the purpose of the property,231 this assertion misses the point and tells us
nothing more than the fact that it is dealing with a novel issue. It is possible
for any public park, street, or sidewalk to have an influx of speakers who
simultaneously seek access to a particular quintessential public forum that
effectively hinders its designated purpose, but this does not necessarily mean
that forum analysis should not apply. Furthermore, the Court buffers its
position by indicating that there is no “long tradition” of permitting the
construction of permanent monuments in quintessential public forums,232
which certainly bolsters its conclusion that the public parks are not a traditional
public forum for the erection of permanent monuments, but is not indicative of
whether or not forum analysis is applicable.
When a monument is held to violate the Establishment Clause and the
government sells the monument and the property beneath it to a nongovernment entity, the situation begins to look more like Capitol Square than
Pleasant Grove City. Specifically, unlike the privately donated monuments in
Pleasant Grove City, when the government sells the unconstitutional religious
monument to a nongovernment entity, the monument represents the expression
225. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1137.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1138.
228. Id. at 1137.
229. Id. at 1138. See also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995) (involving temporary religious displays in state-owned plaza).
230. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
231. Id. at 1137.
232. Id. at 1138.
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of the owner and not the government. Accordingly, most of the Pleasant
Grove City Court’s analysis is inapplicable when a non-government entity
retains the rights associated with the monument and the government has
attempted to distance itself from the monument and its message.
Furthermore, the Pleasant Grove City Court’s conclusion must be read
narrowly, and in conformance with the Court’s premise, to apply to only those
instances where the permanent monuments installed on public property belong
to the government and not a private entity. When a private entity retains rights
in the monument, the situation is better analyzed pursuant to the Court’s forum
analysis as applied in Capital Square. It is impermissible for an administration
to manipulate a public forum in a manner that permits only certain favored
groups to take advantage of it.233 Accordingly, when a government permits a
private entity access to government property to express its views through a
permanent monument, forum analysis is necessary to preserve the First
Amendment rights of individuals that are prohibited from constructing
expressive monuments and to prohibit the government from using a private
individual to erect a monument that it could not erect itself, while excluding all
other individuals from expressing a different viewpoint.
a. Forum Analysis of Public Property Sold to a Private Party
The mere fact that the government sells its property to a private entity is
not conclusive of whether the property is subject to forum analysis, because
First Amendment principles may still govern “even when the government does
not own the property at issue.”234 Accordingly, the protections of the First
Amendment may not be circumvented by the government’s manipulation of a
public park by selling only a portion of it, in an attempt to remedy an
Establishment Clause violation, because it effectively permits the expression of
a single viewpoint while excluding all other speakers.
The threshold issue of whether the property in question remains subject to
forum analysis requires the determination of “whether the property at issue is
in fact privately owned.”235 Accordingly, if the transaction for sale fails to
comply with applicable state and local law, the transaction is invalid, and the

233. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 764, 766.
234. Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated and
remanded, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009) (in light of Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. 1125). See also
Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (holding that the First Amendment was violated when a
corporate-owned municipality restricted individual speech); United Church of Christ v. Gateway
Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 383 F.3d 449, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
privately owned sidewalk surrounding privately owned park was a public forum); Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he
government always retains authority to close a public forum, by selling the property, changing its
physical character, or changing its principal use.”).
235. See Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1271.
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property remains part of the public forum.236 Although governments are
typically cautious to ensure that the transaction complies with applicable
law,237 even government property sold pursuant to a legally valid transaction
may be subject to the strictures of forum analysis.238
Although a forum subject to the constraints of the First Amendment may
lose its status by closing or selling the entire forum, if government property is
sold in a piecemeal fashion, the objective physical characteristics of the
property must be significantly changed in order for the property to lose its
forum status.239 Permitting a government to sell a small portion of a public
park, as opposed to closing or selling the entire forum, permits a government to
manipulate forums protected by the First Amendment.
Specifically,
manipulation of a forum would permit the government to circumvent forum
analysis by effectively removing favored expression, which the Government
cannot itself make, from the commands of the Free Speech Clause in order to
forbid other speech and contrary viewpoints. Accordingly, merely selling a
small piece of property beneath a monument that violated the Establishment
Clause, in the midst of a public park, is likely to be insufficient to significantly
change the objective characteristics of the property as to remove it from forum
analysis.240

236. See id. (noting that if the land transfer of a portion of a public park is invalid, the
religious monument remains on a public forum).
237. Compare Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005) (the
sale complied with Wisconsin state law), and Freedom from Religious Found. v. City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (the sale of the property complied with the
applicable Wisconsin law governing the sale of land by municipalities), with Chambers v. City of
Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–72 (D. Md. 2005) (City failed to comply with its procedural
requirements for the sale of public land).
238. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1270.
239. Id. at 1271. See Hawkins v. City and County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1284, 1287
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that constructing the Galleria, an open air, glass-covered pedestrian
walkway, which was formerly a public street, was a sufficient alteration of characteristics and
function to remove forum status); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 505 U.S. at 700
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that to change a property’s public forum status, the state
“must alter the objective physical character or uses of the property”).
240. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (noting that
government’s intentions and efforts to remove a piece of government property by transferring it
to private owners is insufficient to dictate the status of the property); Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at
1270 (noting that a city’s intention and efforts to remove a piece of property does not dictate the
property’s status). The portion of the public park sold as a result of the finding of an
Establishment Clause violation is generally insufficient in size to serve any other significant
purpose than to display a monument or to engage in other expressive conduct. Compare
Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1284, 1287 (holding that former public street which is now a glass-covered
pedestrian walkway is a sufficient alteration of characteristics and function to remove forum
status), and Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1271 (holding that a fence and disclaimer surrounding a
small parcel of property in the midst of a public park does not necessarily remove the property
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In addition to having significantly different physical characteristics, the
property will not lose its forum status if it merely continues “to serve the same
primary function as it did before the [sale].”241 When the government decides
to sell the property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument, the
property typically continues to display the monument after the sale.242
Accordingly, if the property continues to display the religious monument or
another expressive monument, the property arguably serves the same primary
function as it did before the sale, and, thus, remains part of the public forum.
Lastly, the property will not lose its forum status if the government
remains “inextricably intertwined with the ongoing operation” of the
property.243 If the deed of sale includes a reversionary clause or a restrictive
covenant that mandates the manner in which the property is to be used, the
government exercises great control over the use of the property. Similarly, the
government is excessively involved with the use of the property if it retains the
right to supervise, manage, or control the property.244 Accordingly, unless the
purchaser is granted ownership and usage rights that are not significantly
hindered through restriction or government oversight, the property will remain
subject to forum analysis.
Accordingly, when the government sells a monument that violates the
Establishment Clause and only the portion of the public park beneath the
monument, the post-sale use and physical characteristics will likely be
insufficient to remove the property from forum analysis.
b. Traditional Public Forum
“Traditional public forums” are those places that “have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and. . . .used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”245

from forum analysis), with Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that signs posed at all entrance to Plaza and its differentiation from the
surrounding sidewalks were sufficient objective, physical characteristics to demonstrate that the
Plaza is privately owned).
241. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1270.
242. See Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937,
944 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no alteration because the sidewalk still performed the same role as it
did previously); First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114,
1128 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding the fact that an easement served the same purpose as a public
sidewalk “a persuasive indication that the easement is a traditional public forum”).
243. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1270 (citing Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1256–58).
The expression, however, must be shown to be the private expression of a non-government entity,
through disclaimer signs or by the government relinquishing its rights to the monument, in order
to avoid the application of the government speech doctrine. See supra notes 200–15.
244. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779–80 (9th Cir. 2008).
245. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
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Typically, Courts have viewed streets, sidewalks, and parks as the
quintessential public forums that have “by long tradition or by government
fiat. . . .been devoted to assembly and debate.”246 The Supreme Court has been
unwilling to extend traditional public forum status beyond these historic
confines or to areas where history is lacking.247
A speaker may not be excluded from a traditional public forum based on
the content of his speech, unless the restriction is “necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that
interest.”248 However, a reasonable, content-neutral time, place, or manner
restriction that is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest”
that “leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication” is
permissible.249
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that a public park is not a
traditional public forum for the construction of permanent monuments, because
public parks lack a “long tradition” of being held open to the public for
permitting people to construct permanent monuments.250 Accordingly, a
speaker’s desire to erect a permanent monument in a public park, which also
houses a permanent monument that was sold to a non-governmental entity in
an attempt to remedy an Establishment Clause violation, would unlikely be
analyzed as a traditional public forum.
c. Designated Public Forum
A government may create a “designated public forum” by intentionally
opening property that has not traditionally been used as a public forum for use
by the public at large for expressive activities.251 However, a designated
public forum cannot be created by government inaction or limited disclosure;
instead, the government must intentionally open a nontraditional forum for the
purpose of public expression.252 Though the government is not required to
keep a designated forum open indefinitely, so long as the forum remains open,
it is subject to the same restrictions as a traditional public forum.253 When a
government decision to sell a permanent monument in a public park is
designed to remedy the Establishment Clause violation, the sale would not
likely open a designated public forum for the construction of permanent

246. Id.
247. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
248. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
249. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
250. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1137 (2009).
251. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
252. Id. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758 (1995)
(noting that the Board has permitted a variety of unattended displays in the park).
253. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 802.
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monuments in a public park because the government does not intend to and
cannot accidentally create a public forum.
d. Nonpublic Forum
Because the construction of a permanent monument in a public park is
neither a traditional or designated public forum, it must be characterized as a
nonpublic forum.254 In a nonpublic forum, government may, in addition to
time, place, and manner regulations, “reserve the forum for its intended
purposes. . . .as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.”255 The government, like a property owner, has the authority to preserve
its property for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.256
The government undoubtedly has reasonable interests in forbidding the
construction of permanent monuments in public parks in order to prevent
against the influx of clutter and to preserve the purpose of the government
property. However, when the government sells a permanent monument and a
portion of the public park beneath it in an attempt to remedy an Establishment
Clause violation, the government cannot then deny the construction of a
similar monument expressing a different viewpoint. Specifically, when the
government permits the construction or display of a religious monument in a
nonpublic forum that it could not construct or display on its own while denying
similar access to different religious monuments, the government is
impermissibly discriminating on account of viewpoint. Accordingly, by
permitting access to a government favored religious monument, while
discriminating against other viewpoints, the government infringes on the Free
Speech rights of an entity seeking equal access to the nonpublic forum to
convey a different viewpoint.
D. Equal Protection Clause
In light of the shaky and inconsistent tests applicable to Establishment
Clause claims, scholars have proposed that new tools, specifically the Equal
Protection Clause, be used to preserve religious equality.257 In theory, the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination against religion and requires
that all religions be treated equally under the law.258 Although scholars have

254. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shall Use The Equal Protection
Clause For Religion Cases (Not Just The Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665,
741–43 (2008) (proposing that an Equal Protection Clause claim be used in addition to the typical
Establishment Clause claim).
258. Shidler v. Moore, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1065 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
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advocated its use, the Equal Protection Clause has not been successfully
invoked or adopted by a court in a challenge against government action that
allegedly discriminates based on religion.259 However, the Equal Protection
Clause has successfully been invoked to prohibit a government from granting
access to government property for the expression of speech it deems
acceptable, while denying use to less favored speech.260
Nevertheless, if the government were to use religion to determine the
purchaser of the property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument, the
governmental action would be subject to the commands of the Equal Protection
Clause.261 Accordingly, when the government selects its purchaser on account
of religion, the decision is suspect and should be subject to the strictest
scrutiny.262 When the government decides to extend an offer for the sale of a
portion of a public park only to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness
to preserve the monument, the government effectively discriminates against
those who hold beliefs inconsistent with the monument’s message.263
Similarly, if the government rejects higher bids in order to sell the property to
an entity that will undoubtedly preserve the monument,264 the government is
effectively discriminating on account of religion. A government could attempt
to justify its actions by explaining that nonadherents would desecrate the
monument or demonstrate feelings of ill will towards the monument and its
associated beliefs. However, even if this explanation were considered a
compelling state interest, it would not be narrowly tailored, because the
government could simply remove the monument without discriminating on
account of religion and avoid the perceived harms of a public sale.
Accordingly, a governmental decision to sell the property to an entity that has
demonstrated its willingness to preserve the monument’s display appears to
run counter to the principles of the Equal Protection Clause.

259. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (noting there is no justification for applying the Equal
Protection’s strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test).
260. Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
261. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). Discrimination of this nature would
also run counter to the equality principles of the Establishment Clause. See Bd. of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994).
262. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
263. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
purchaser was the original donor of the monument).
264. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005) (City failed to
comply with procedural requirements for the sale of public land and despite the fact that the
Fraternal Order of Eagles, the original donor of the unconstitutional religious monument, did not
submit the highest bid, the property was sold to them upon the determination that they would be
able to best take care of the monument).
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Contempt of Court

Courts of equity have the inherent power to preserve the status quo of a
case in which it has jurisdiction in order to protect its ability to render
judgments.265 Any improper interference with property that is in custody of
the law is contempt of court.266 Additionally, the willful diversion of the
property, which is the subject matter of a pending suit, beyond the reach of the
court “to defeat any decree which the court might ultimately make in the
cause” may also constitute contempt.267
When the government sells the unconstitutional religious monument and
the property beneath it, in anticipation of litigation or after an order requiring
the monument’s removal, the governmental conduct can be perceived as an
attempt to remove the property from the reach of the court. Although the
government’s actions might arguably remedy an Establishment Clause
violation, such action violates an injunction that prohibits the monument’s
display or mandates its removal.268 Furthermore, this disruptive conduct not
only jeopardizes the effect of the court’s order, but also undercuts its ability to
enter and effectuate future orders.269 Accordingly, the government’s willful
decision to sell the government property beneath the monument is an attempt
to evade the injunctive order and, thus, amounts to contempt.270 Furthermore,
if it is shown that the purchaser had knowledge of the injunction at the time of
the purchase, the purchaser could likely be held in contempt for acting in
concert with the government in evading the injunction.271
V. CONCLUSION
The manipulation of public parks in order to display passive religious
monuments might not be the prevention of a “national ecclesiastical

265. U.S. v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1972).
266. See Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 219 (1932).
267. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 363 F.2d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 1966)
(finding contempt where the disbursement of monies seriously impaired the litigation).
268. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (The District Court “entered a
permanent injunction ordering that the ‘Defendants, their employees, agents, and those in active
concert with Defendants, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from permitting display
of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.”). Although the
argument can be made that the given property is no longer being displayed on the “government
property” this would just require injunctions to be more specific in their land descriptions.
269. See Hall, 472 U.S. at 265 (applying same rationale to evasion of desegregation
injunction).
270. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 778, 771–82 (noting that the transfer of property was designed to
evade the permanent injunction enjoining the display of the cross).
271. Roe v. Operation Rescue, 54 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that urging others to
participate in conduct that violates the injunction may support a finding of contempt against the
participants).
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establishment” that the founders feared and hoped to thwart when enacting the
Establishment Clause.272 However, permitting the government to manipulate
its property in a manner that allows the continued display of an
unconstitutional religious monument, runs counter to the Constitution’s
encouragement of equality and diversity.273 Although courts across the nation
have continually struggled to draw a satisfactory line to adequately protect the
church and the state from unnecessary intrusion into the sphere of the other,
permitting governments to sell an unconstitutional religious monument and the
property beneath it to ensure its continued display enables favored religious
messages to flourish in public parks while avoiding the commands of the
Establishment Clause.
Courts have consistently brought attention to the fact that the current
presumption of constitutionality is highly susceptible to manipulation; thus,
evincing the need for a standard that will curb this obvious danger and thwart
extraordinary governmental efforts to preserve the continued display of
unconstitutional religious monuments. Accordingly, courts should subject
these suspect transactions to the highest level of scrutiny, and courts must
analyze these sales on a transaction-by-transaction basis examining the form
and substance to ensure that the Establishment Clause violation has ceased.
However, in light of the current presumption and the accompanying
factors’ inability to protect religious liberty against even the most blatant
manipulations, a court should begin its analysis with the strong presumption
that the sale of the monument and the property beneath it is insufficient to end
the Establishment Clause violation. In fact, the government’s decision to sell
the unconstitutional monument and the property beneath it, in lieu of removal,
is the precise religious favoritism that the Establishment Clause forbids.
Even if one were to assume that a sale would remedy the Establishment
Clause violation, courts must analyze the transaction with an emphasis on
equality, fairness, and neutrality to prevent the perception that the government
is favoring the religious beliefs in question. Specifically, Courts should ensure
that all individuals who desire to purchase the unconstitutional monument and
the property beneath it are afforded an opportunity to do so and the property is
awarded to the highest bidder. Additionally, courts should ensure that the

272. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (quoting 3 JOSEPH A. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, &
Co. 1833)).
273. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition of Certiorari at 3, Kempthorne v. Buono, No. 08472, (2008) (asking the Supreme Court “[w]hether, after a court has held that the presence of a
sectarian religious symbol on government land violates the Establishment Clause, the transfer of
that land perpetuates the Establishment Clause violation”).
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government retains no control over, or rights in, the post-sale use of the
property.
Even if a court concludes that the monument and the property beneath it
were sold in a manner that ends the perception of government endorsement, the
governmental manipulation of its public park would likely subject the post-sale
monument to the strictures of forum analysis. Specifically, if the monument is
truly private speech and if the property has not undergone significant physical
changes or is not used in a significantly different way, the Free Speech Clause
requires equal access to monuments expressing different religious viewpoints.
Accordingly, if the government prohibits the construction of any similar
monument in the forum that expresses a different viewpoint, the denial of
access may run counter to the Free Speech Clause.
Therefore, in order to properly preserve religious rights, courts must either
simply forbid governments from selling a monument and the property beneath
it, in lieu of merely removing the monument, in an attempt to remedy an
Establishment Clause violation or must subject the transaction to the strictest
scrutiny. To permit any lesser protection for such a sacred right would permit
the government to manipulate its forums to ensure the continued display of a
favored, unconstitutional religious monument, while excluding all other nonfavored viewpoints. Only the strictest scrutiny of the sale of government
property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument will ensure that the
government will act with neutrality between religions and between religion and
non-religion. Most importantly, the strictest scrutiny is necessary to preserve
the religious equality principles guaranteed by the Constitution’s
Establishment, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses.
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